In a global context where popular referenda are increasingly used to decide contested issues, this paper aims at exploring the framework in which, in October 2017, two referenda took place in the Italian northern regions of Veneto and Lombardia to seek additional forms and conditions of autonomy within the Italian regional state as painted by the Constitution after the 2001 reform. By adopting mainly an analytical perspective, this contribution studies the political and constitutional underpinnings of the two referenda while at the same time providing a cursory comparative account of differential and asymmetric regionalism.
Introduction
Over these past few years, the use of referenda across Europe has become a common tool to democratically decide controversial or contested issues: for example, the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union (the so-called Brexit referendum of 2016) and the more recent referendum for the secession of Catalonia from Spain of October 2017 have monopolized public attention and stirred lively academic, constitutional and political debates in Europe and elsewhere. Within this context, on 22 October 2017, two separate referenda for increased autonomy took place in the Italian Northern regions of Veneto and Lombardia, resulting in an overwhelming support for more regional autonomy (although, at a closer look, the outcome was not perfectly identical in the two regions, as it will be better explained in the remainder of the paper). And while these two Italian referenda are hardly comparable with the Brexit and Catalonia examples -because of a quite different overall context -they are worth a more thorough scrutiny as part of the general debate on comparative regionalism. The objective of this contribution is thus to discuss the referenda in the Norther Italian regions and offer an analytical account of their legal and constitutional underpinnings. The article is divided in three parts. Paragraph 1 offers a brief overview of Italian regionalism to help better situate the specific debate on increased autonomy; paragraph 2 extensively studies the two referenda, while paragraph 3 provides a cursory comparative account of differential and asymmetrical regionalism. The special status enjoyed by the five regions basically granted them additional powers -mainly in the fiscal ambit -so that they could deal more effectively and more autonomously with their intrinsic disparities: with the significant exception of Sicilia, however, this fiscal autonomy has been a gradual achievement in all of them. Differences between special and ordinary regions exist also with regards to their regional statuti: in fact, for ordinary regions, statutes are adopted and amended by the Regional Council with no approval of the central government (see article 123(2) Const.)), while the statutes of special regions shall be adopted by constitutional law (article 116(1) Const.).
IV
While at the time of its implementation it was pacifically accepted, over these past few years the special status of the five autonomous regions has been repeatedly questioned: in fact, in political and academic circles alike, many see this classification between ordinary and special regions as obsolete, especially for the regions in the North, considering that borders and language differences no longer have the importance of the past in the specific context of the European Union, and the Cold War that separated Eastern from Western Europe -of which Friuli Venezia Giulia was one of the bastions -is long forgotten (Rolla 2015: 1-2). However, the five autonomous regions are somehow jealous and proud of their special status and are fighting hard to preserve it: this is particularly true in the North, where the three aforementioned regions -while smaller and less populated than othersare wealthy territories with very high life quality standards that situate them among the richest areas not only in Italy but also in Europe. Most importantly, however, there are legal reasons that make it quite complicated to depart from the status quo: in fact, the abolition of the special autonomy would require a constitutional amendment pursuant to the procedure set forth in article 138 Const., not to mention the need to comply with international commitments (especially with regards to Trentino-Alto Adige, as discussed above).
In any event, the regional model created in 1948 was significantly revised and reshaped of distinction that is particularly relevant for the present discussion and which will be the main focus of this contribution. In fact, article 116(3) Const. now allows ordinary regions to negotiate with the central government particular forms and conditions of autonomy in specific subject matters, including all areas of shared jurisdiction between the state and the regions (as detailed in article 117(3) Const.), as well as the following, specific subject matters normally falling within the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the central state:
organizational requirements of the justice of the peace (article 117(2)(l)), general norms on education (article 117(2)(n)), and the protection of the environment, eco-system and cultural heritage (article 117(2)(s)). More precisely, article 116(3) Const. mandates that:
Additional special forms and conditions of autonomy, related to the areas specified in art. 117, paragraph three and paragraph two, letter l) -limited to the organizational requirements of the Justice of the Peace -and letters n) and s), may be attributed to other autonomy. This choice is commendable as it leaves quite some room to the regions to map their priorities through the negotiation of increased legislative powers. In this regard, article 116(3) Const. also details the procedure that needs to be followed in order to implement differential regionalism: this procedure is rather complex, as it requires the concomitant agreement and approval of several different actors who must all concur in the decision: in fact, the initiative must come from the region concerned after consulting with local authorities, followed by a state law (passed by absolute majority by both houses of 
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certainly innovative and original because of its intrinsic flexibility, the provision on differential regionalism enshrined in article 116(3) Const. has regrettably remained dormant, almost forgotten, for a long time, as most (but not all) ordinary regions did not seem to be interested in the opportunity offered to them. The reasons that explain why article 116 (3) has been neglected for so long are complex and not always easy to identify. Certainly, the procedure set forth in the article to achieve differential regionalism is quite articulate and not easily applicable, thus maybe discouraging regions from pursuing this avenue. Other reasons are linked to the fact that the 2001 constitutional reform was not unanimously well received, and actually many political parties were dissatisfied with it, including the LN that never fully approved the 2001 constitutional reform, as it considered it not "federal" Const. that Veneto and Lombardia decided to call a referendum to begin negotiations with the central government for increased autonomy although, as noted above, the constitutional provision does not require this form of democratic consultation. However, before discussing these events more in detail in paragraph 2 of the paper, it is perhaps worth offering a quick overview of the institution of referendum in Italy.
The use of referenda in Italy
In Italy, the institute of referendum is solidly entrenched in the Constitution, and it has been extensively used as a form of direct democracy throughout the years. At national level, the Constitution acknowledges three types of referenda: (i) abrogative, used for the abolition -in whole or in part -of a national law (article 75 Const.);
VII ( Building upon some past decisions, the ItCC also explained that regions are allowed to organize advisory referenda also on issues falling outside regional competences and boundaries -issues thus having a "national" dimension -but regions cannot take on initiatives exceeding the boundaries set forth by the constitution (ItCC ruling 118/2015, par. 5). In fact, the ItCC pointed out that, even when they are not binding (and thus merely advisory), referenda can still trigger, influence or contrast public decisions, so national and regional referenda alike shall always comply with the provisions contained in the constitution or enacted in pursuance thereof (ItCC ruling 118/2015, par. 5). Finally, the ItCC also contended that regional referenda can never involve constitutional choices even when they are merely advisory (ItCC ruling 118/2015, par. 6, citing past decisions). I will discuss this aspect again with regards to the referendum in Veneto.
The referenda in Veneto and Lombardia

Veneto
Before discussing the referendum question as presented in October 2017, it is perhaps worth underlying how this was not the first attempt for Veneto to seek more autonomy: in 
Regional Law 16/2014 and ItCC ruling 118/2015
Regional Law 16/2014 was particularly instructive -also in comparative termsbecause it set the scheme for an advisory referendum on the secession of Veneto from
Italy, so that Veneto could become an independent and sovereign republic. XIII In order to understand the reasons behind this referendum question and the desire for secession, it might be useful to point out that, from a historical standpoint, the territory of present-day 
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falling outside the scope of a regional referendum (ItCC ruling 118/2015, par.8.6) . In this regard, it shall be pointed out that, geographically speaking, Veneto borders two autonomous regions, Trentino-Alto Adige and Friuli Venezia Giulia (this three-region territory is also informally referred to as Triveneto or Tre Venezie) and it has suffered for a lack of special status also considering its past history of independent statehood as Republic of Venice.
The referendum of 22 October 2017
Regional Law XXXIV Although also in this case there was an overwhelming majority of electors casting a vote in favor of more autonomy, the outcome of this referendum was not identical to that of Veneto -as it might appear at first sight -for at least two reasons: first, the percentage of people who voted was significantly smaller than in Veneto (38.34% vs 57.2%) and, secondly, in the city of Milan (the largest city in Lombardia and one of the most important industrial and economic centers in Europe) only a small percentage of electors casted a vote.
XXXV
In any event, the question asked at the referendum read as follows: Considering its
specialty, and within the framework of national unity, do you want that Regione Lombardia undertakes the necessary institutional steps to ask the government the attribution of additional forms and conditions of autonomy, with the related resources, pursuant to article 116(3) Const., and on any legislative subject matter for which such procedure is allowed in the aforementioned article?
XXXVI
The first thing to note regarding the referendum question in Lombardia is that it was much more articulated and elaborated than the one presented in Veneto. The question opened with an explicit reference to an alleged specialty of the region, something that the regional government explained by resorting to the important structural, social, economic, cultural features and numerous potentialities that characterize this territory. XXXVII Among the various indicators used to explain this specialty, the regional government particularly emphasized the following: (i) significant fiscal balance; (ii) per capita GDP higher than the EU average; (iii) excellent health system; (iv) national export; (v) lowest per capita debt; and (vi) efficiency and soundness of public administration at municipal, provincial and regional levels. XXXVIII As it is obvious, these indicators refer to the unique socio-economic fabric of the region to explain its specialty or uniqueness, and not to linguistic or otherwise ethnocultural features. With specific regards to fiscal balance (residuo fiscale), this is explained as the difference between the taxes that citizens pay to the central government and the amount that the central state gives back to the regional territory: in Lombardia, this fiscal balance amounts to EUR 54 billion per year (more than double of the current regional budget of EUR 23 billion). While the focus of this contribution are the two referenda in Veneto and Lombardia, we also made reference to the path to differential regionalism initiated by Emilia-Romagna.
In fact, also this region is currently negotiating additional forms and conditions of autonomy in key strategic areas pursuant to article 116(3) Const., although it has done so without resorting to an advisory referendum. The goal of the regional government of Emilia-Romagna is to seek more legislative and administrative autonomy so as to directly manage some subject matters that are fundamental for the additional social and economic growth of its territories, and to simplify administrative procedure and decisional mechanisms in the following four strategic areas: (i) jobs and vocational training; (ii) enterprises, research and development; (iii) health care; (iv) land-use planning and environment. The objective of this strengthened autonomy is to help improve the standard performances of regional and local institutions and thus benefit the whole regional community (including citizens, business activities, local self-governments, associations and vocational agencies) by adopting a subsidiarity-based approach to the performance of relevant functions by bringing them closer to localities. As explained supra, the provision on differential regionalism enshrined in article 116 (3) Const. was one of the most interesting novelties introduced with the constitutional reform of 2001: because not all regions shared the same positive sentiments towards federalism, this provision gave the possibility to acquire additional forms and conditions of autonomy only to those territories which were truly interested in it. We also noted that it was only very recently that the actual possibilities offered by this provision have been tested, since for a long time this article has remained neglected. It is thus too early to assess the actual value of differential regionalism considering that the negotiations between the central government and Veneto, Lombardia and Emilia-Romagna are still ongoing.
In any event, while the provision enshrined in article 116(3) Const. is quite unique in the overall landscape of federal and quasi-federal arrangements, a parallel can nonetheless be made with the so-called principio dispositivo found in the Constitution of the Spanish autonomic state, also in light of the reciprocal influence that the Spanish and Italian regional models have historically exerted on each other. Simply put, the principio dispositivo provides that each autonomous community ("AC") may decide which legislative competencies it will assume among those that are constitutionally possible under the Spanish constitution. In Spain, the territorial distribution of legislative powers is -at least on paper -very asymmetrical, as these powers are not constitutionally enshrined ( 
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constitutional autonomy" and that supposes some discretion in identifying a given community, the competences it is called to exercise, and its specific organization, although both quantitative and qualitative aspects of this asymmetry shall also be grounded in a number of social, cultural and economic differential factors (Rolla 2015: 4).
Conclusion
The two Italian referenda discussed in this paper were organized in regions that are amongst the wealthiest and economically successful not only in Italy but also in Europe.
These referenda were the culminating point of movements for more autonomy that had started well before, and that wished to express a desire for increased powers and to emancipate from a central government that is perceived as distant and incapable of taking adequate care and respond to the needs of these territories. In any event, it is not certain how things will evolve both for Veneto and Lombardia: the situation is still in fieri and, while at the time we are writing negotiations are ongoing, it is unclear to what extent the two regions will be successful in their claims. Among other things, Italy is undergoing a profound political, economic and moral crisis, and regional claims -especially when coming from the North -are not on the priority list. But ignoring or dismissing these aspirations as mere expressions of greed does not eliminate them but simply strengthen them for future action.
Finally, it should be acknowledged that finding an effective solution to current challenges requires more than legal or doctrinal tricks, or a ruling of the CJEU. Upholding constitutionalism requires an intervention in the societal and cultural dimension too. The EU is not the only player in the field. It is therefore crucial that national actors perceive its intervention as legitimate and objective, otherwise it may become counterproductive. In order to avoid this, EU institutions should be careful not to overstep the boundaries of the current constitutional settlement, including the principle of national and constitutional identity. '[t] he Republic is composed of municipalities, provinces, metropolitan cities, regions and the state. Municipalities, provinces, metropolitan cities and regions are autonomous entities having their own statutes, powers and functions in accordance with the principles laid down in the Constitution.' II The capital city of Friuli Venezia Giulia is Trieste. In 1948, Trieste and its territory were divided into two zones: zone A (comprising the city of Trieste and some neighboring municipalities) and zone B (the territory of present-day Istria and Slovenia). The Memorandum of Understanding between Italy, United Kingdom, United States, and Yugoslavia -signed in London in 1954 -granted the administration of zone A to Italy, whilst Yugoslavia was granted the administration of zone B. However, although zone A was under Italian administration, it was not under Italian sovereignty: this situation was resolved only with the ratification in 1975 of the Treaty of Osimo defining present-day borders (Bin & Falcon 2012: 75-76) . III The autonomous status of these two provinces (a consequence of the reception by Italy of the agreements between the Italian and Austrian governments and included in the peace agreements following WWII, as previously noted) is a unique feature, as no other province in Italy enjoys similar privileges: among other things, the statuto of Trentino-Alto Adige (articles 8-10) endows these provinces with legislative powers in enumerated areas -thus making them de facto more similar to regions than to other Italian provinces (which lack any power to make provincial laws) (Rolla 2015: 13-14) . IV More specifically, article 123 Const. provides that: '[e]ach Region shall have a statute which, in compliance with the Constitution, shall lay down the form of government and basic principles for the organization of the Region and the conduct of its business. The statute shall regulate the right to initiate legislation and promote referenda on the laws and administrative measures of the Region as well as the publication of laws and of regional regulations. Regional statutes are adopted and amended by the Regional Council with a law approved by an absolute majority of its members, with two subsequent deliberations at an interval of not less than two months. This law does not require the approval of the Government commissioner. The Government of the Republic may submit the constitutional legitimacy of the regional statutes to the Constitutional Court within thirty days of their publication. The statute is submitted to popular referendum if one-fiftieth of the electors of the Region or one-fifth of the members of the Regional Council so request within three months from its publication. The statute that is submitted to referendum is not promulgated if it is not approved by the majority of valid votes. In each Region, statutes regulate the activity of the Council of local authorities as a consultative body on relations between the Regions and local authorities.' V It is not the purpose of this contribution to offer a detailed account of the 2001 constitutional reform, as an abundant literature -both in Italian and English -already exists. The reader who is interested in learning more about it can resort to the bibliography for additional sources on the subject. VI Article 117(1) Const., as modified in 2001, indicates that legislative powers are vested in the central and regional governments. Article 117(2) Const. lists the subject matters exclusively assigned to the legislative powers of the central government. Article 117(3) Const. enumerates the subject matters of shared jurisdiction between central and regional governments, and article 117(4) Const. assigns to regions all residual legislative powers (eg powers not explicitly assigned to either level of government by the constitution). The list of subject matters of shared jurisdiction as spelled out in article 117(3) Const. is rather comprehensive, as it includes the following: international and EU relations of the Regions; foreign trade; job protection and safety; education (subject to the autonomy of educational institutions and with the exception of vocational education and training); professions; scientific and technological research and innovation support for productive sectors; health protection; nutrition; sports; disaster relief; land-use planning; civil ports and airports; large transport and navigation networks; communications; national production, transport and distribution of energy; complementary and supplementary social security; harmonization of public accounts and coordination of public finance and taxation system; enhancement of cultural and environmental properties, including the promotion and organization of cultural activities; savings banks, rural banks, regional credit institutions; regional land and agricultural credit institutions. It is worth pointing out that article 117(3) Const. further specifies that, for subject matters of concurring legislation, 'legislative powers are vested in the Regions, except for the determination of the fundamental principles, which are laid down in State legislation'. VII Article 75 Const. provides that '[a] general referendum may be held to repeal, in whole or in part, a law or a measure having the force of law, when so requested by five hundred thousand voters or five Regional Councils. No referendum may be held on a law regulating taxes, the budget, amnesty or pardon, or a law ratifying an international treaty. Any citizen entitled to vote for the Chamber of deputies has the right to vote in a referendum. The referendum shall be considered to have been carried if the majority of those eligible has voted and a majority of valid votes has been achieved.' VIII Article 138 Const. provides that '[l] aws amending the Constitution and other constitutional laws shall be adopted by each House after two successive debates at intervals of not less than three months, and shall be approved by an absolute majority of the members of each House in the second voting. Said laws are submitted to a popular referendum when, within three months of their publication, such request is made by one-fifth of the members of a House or five hundred thousand voters or five Regional Councils. The law submitted to referendum shall not be promulgated if not approved by a majority of valid votes. A referendum shall not be held if the law has been approved in the second voting by each of the Houses by a majority of two-thirds of the members.' IX Article 132 Const. mandates that '[b]y a constitutional law, after consultation with the Regional Councils, a merger between existing Regions or the creation of new Regions having a minimum of one million inhabitants may be agreed, when such request has been made by a number of Municipal Councils representing not less than one third of the populations involved, and the request has been approved by referendum by a majority of said populations. The Provinces and Municipalities which request to be detached from a Region and incorporated in another may be allowed to do so, following a referendum and a law of the Republic, which obtains the majority of the populations of the Province or Provinces and of the Municipality or Municipalities concerned, and after having heard the Regional Councils. '[t] he Republic form shall not be a matter for constitutional amendment.' It might be interesting to confront in this regard the conclusion reached by the ItCC on the secession proposal of Veneto with a similar ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court on the Catalan secession referendum. In fact, in January 2013 the Catalan Parliament passed a resolution proclaiming that the Catalan people are sovereign and thus have a right to decide their future -in other words, they can freely decide whether to secede from Spain. The reaction of the Spanish government was to bring this Declaration before the Constitutional Court, which rendered its decision in March 2014. Among other things, the Spanish Constitutional Court referred to article 2 Const. proclaiming the indissoluble unity of Spain: for the Court, the Catalan people cannot, legally speaking, be sovereign and, as a result, Spanish regions cannot unilaterally call a referendum of self-determination. However, differently than Veneto -where the ItCC said that the principle of unity enshrined in article 5 Const. is unamendable -the Spanish Court insisted on the fact that the Spanish Constitution (and consequently article 2 on the indissoluble unity of Spain) can always be amended pursuant to the procedures contained therein: this means that, for the Spanish Court, no constitutional principle is immune from amendment, not even principles establishing the unity of Spain and the sovereignty of the Spanish people (Ferreres Comella 2014: 571-590) XVI The terms of question #2 were: 'Do you want that at least 80% of the taxes paid annually by the citizens of Veneto are used locally?' XVII The terms of question #3 were: 'Do you want that Veneto keeps at least 80% of the revenues locally?' XVIII The regional statute of Veneto, contained in Regional Law 1/2012, regulates regional referenda in articles 26 and 27. In particular, article 26(4)(a)(b) does not allow to call a regional referendum on fiscal and budgetary laws or on regional laws passed in compliance to constitutional, international and EU obligations: see ItCC ruling 118/2015, par. 6. XIX The terms of question #4 were: 'Do you want that the revenues coming from the financial sources be freed from any allocation constraint?' XX Article 119(5) Const. mandates that '[t] he State shall allocate supplementary resources and adopt special measures in favor of specific municipalities, provinces, metropolitan cities and regions to promote economic development along with social cohesion and solidarity, to reduce economic and social imbalances, to foster the exercise of the rights of the person or to achieve goals other than those pursued in the ordinary implementation of their functions.'
